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Abstract We classify and analyze bit errors in the current
measurement mode of the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise
(KLJN) key distribution. The error probability decays ex-
ponentially with increasing bit exchange period and fixed
bandwidth, which is similar to the error probability decay in
the voltage measurement mode. We also analyze the com-
bination of voltage and current modes for error removal. In
this combination method, the error probability is still an ex-
ponential function that decays with the duration of the bit
exchange period, but it has superior fidelity to the former
schemes.
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1 Introduction
Information theoretic security, often referred to as “uncon-
ditional security” [1], means that the security measures are
determined by information theory or, in physical systems,
by measurement theory. These security measures can be
perfect or imperfect and are determined by the eavesdrop-
per’s (“Eve’s”) supposed optimum conditions for extracting
the maximum amount of information. In other words, Eve’s
information is calculated by assuming that she has unlim-
ited computational power and that her measurement accu-
racy and measurement speed are limited only by the laws of
physics and the protocol’s conditions.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [2] was the first scheme
based on the laws of physics that claimed to possess uncon-
ditional security. However, this claim is not uncontested and
there is an ongoing debate [3–7] about the security inher-
ent in existing QKD schemes. This discussion was initiated
by quantum security experts Horace Yuen [3, 4, 7] and Os-
amu Hirota [5], who agreed in their claim that the achiev-
able level of security in QKD schemes is questionable. Ren-
ner [6] later entered this debate to defend the foundations
of quantum cryptography and to validate existing security
proofs.
From a practical point of view one observes that several
communicators, including commercial and laboratory-type
QKD devices, have been successfully cracked, as shown in
numerous publications [8–22]. These demonstrated flaws of
the QKD devices—and also some practical issues such as
limited communication range and high price—have inspired
new initiatives that involve non-QKD schemes utilizing al-
ternative types of mechanisms to achieve security [23, 24].
Recent studies have shown that a system employing
two pairs of resistors, with Gaussian voltage noise gener-
ators to imitate and enhance their Johnson noise, can be
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Fig. 1 Outline of the core KLJN secure key exchange scheme with-
out defense circuitry (current/voltage monitoring/comparison) against
invasive attacks or attacks utilizing non-ideal components and condi-
tions. Teff is the effective noise temperature, RA, uA(t), RB , and uB(t)
are the resistor values and noise voltages at Alice and Bob, respectively.
uc(t) and ic(t) are channel noise voltage and current, respectively
used for secure key distribution [25–30]. This system is
known as the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure
key distribution and provides information theoretic secu-
rity [26, 27]. It is based on Kirchhoff’s loop law of quasi-
electrodynamics and the fluctuation–dissipation theorem of
statistical physics [25–31]. The KLJN scheme has potential
applications including physical uncloneable function hard-
ware keys [32]; unconditional security within computers,
hardware and other instruments [32, 33]; and uncondition-
ally secure smart grids [34–36].
Figure 1 shows the fundamental KLJN system [25–30]
without defense elements against active (invasive) attacks
and vulnerabilities represented by non-ideal building ele-
ments. Under practical conditions, this system utilizes en-
hanced Johnson noise with high noise temperature, obtained
from Gaussian noises generated electronically so that quasi-
static and thermodynamic characteristics are emulated as
accurately as possible, in order to approach perfect se-
curity [31]. The core KLJN channel is represented by a
wire line to which the two communicating parties, “Al-
ice” and “Bob”, connect their resistors RA and RB , re-
spectively. These resistors are randomly selected from the
set {R0,R1}, with R0 = R1. The resistor R0 indicates the
low (0) bit and the resistor R1 indicates the high (1) bit,
respectively [25]. At the beginning of each clock period
or bit exchange period, Alice and Bob, who have identi-
cal pairs of resistors, randomly choose one of these resis-
tors and connect it to the wire line. The Gaussian volt-
age noise generators represent either the Johnson noises of
the resistors or external noise generators delivering band-
limited white noise with publicly known bandwidth and
effective noise temperature Teff [25, 26, 30]. According
to the fluctuation–dissipation theorem, the enhanced John-
son noise voltages of Alice’s and Bob’s resistors—denoted
uA(t) and uB(t) respectively, where uA ∈ {u0,A(t), u1,A(t)}
and uB ∈ {u0,B(t), u1,B(t)}—generate a channel noise volt-
age uc(t) between the wire line and ground as well as a
channel noise current ic(t) in the wire.
Within the bit exchange period, Alice and Bob measure
the mean-square channel noise voltage and/or current am-
plitudes 〈u2c(t)〉 and/or 〈i2c (t)〉. By applying Johnson’s noise
formula and Kirchhoff’s loop law, it follows that the theoret-
ical values of the mean-square noise voltage and current for
a given channel noise bandwidth BKLJN and temperature
Teff are [25, 26]
〈
u2c(t)
〉 = Su,c(f )BKLJN = 4kTeff R‖BKLJN, (1a)
〈
i2c (t)
〉 = Si,c(f )BKLJN = 4kTeff 1
Rloop
BKLJN . (1b)
Here 〈〉 represents ideal infinite-time average, Su,c(f ) is
the power density spectrum of the channel noise voltage,
Si,c(f ) is the power density spectrum of channel noise cur-
rent, k is Boltzmann’s constant, R‖ = RARB/(RA + RB),
and Rloop = RA + RB .
The resistance values R‖ and/or Rloop can be publicly
known by comparing the result of the measurement of the
mean-square channel noise voltage and/or current ampli-
tudes with the corresponding theoretical values obtained
from Eqs. (1a), (1b). Alice and Bob know their own chosen
resistors, and hence the total resistances R‖ and/or Rloop al-
low them to deduce the resistance value and actual bit status
at the other end of the wire.
The cases when Alice and Bob use the same resistance
values—i.e., the 00 and 11 situations—represent non-secure
bit exchange. Eve will then be able to find the resistor val-
ues, their location and the status of the bits, because the to-
tal resistance will either be the lowest or the highest value
of the three possible magnitudes of the total resistance. The
situations when Alice and Bob use the resistance values 01
and 10 signify a secure bit exchange event because these re-
sistances cannot be distinguished by measured mean-square
values. Alice and Bob will know that the other party has the
inverse of her/his bit, which implies that a secure key ex-
change takes place.
The KLJN key distribution scheme has statistical errors
due to the finite duration time τ of the bit-exchange period
[30, 31]. Specifically, an experimental demonstration of the
KLJN scheme, conducted recently by Mingesz et al. [30],
yielded that the fidelity of the KLJN key exchange was
99.98 %, corresponding to a bit error probability of 0.02 %.
The bit errors were analyzed recently by Saez and
Kish [31] for the case of the mean square noise voltage being
utilized for key exchange. The bit error probability showed
exponential decay vs. τ . In the present paper we analyze the
bit errors in the current measurement mode, and we also
analyze the combination of voltage and current modes for
error mitigation.
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Fig. 2 Illustration of statistical fluctuations of the finite-time
mean-square current levels around their mean values for the 11, 01/10
and 00 bit situations. The scales are arbitrary. Solid lines denote exact
(infinite) time average results. 3 and 4 are thresholds for bit inter-
pretation
2 Bit interpretation of the measured channel current
We suppose ideal components/conditions and proceed as in
earlier work [31]. Alice and Bob obtain the total loop resis-
tance by measuring the mean-square channel noise current
amplitude 〈i2c (t)〉τ , where 〈〉τ indicates a finite-time aver-
age over random fluctuations around the exact mean-square
noise current. Figure 2 illustrates the three possible levels
of the measured mean-square channel noise current. The 11,
01/10 and 00 bit situations result in mean-square channel
noise currents 〈i211(t)〉τ , 〈i201/10(t)〉τ and 〈i200(t)〉τ , respec-
tively.
Thresholds determine the boundaries between the dif-
ferent interpretations of the measured mean-square channel
noise currents [31]. In the present paper, we use thresh-
old values 3 and 4 to interpret the measured mean-
square channel current over the time window τ , as indi-
cated in Fig. 2. The interpretation is 11 when 〈i2c (t)〉τ <
〈i211(t)〉 + 3, and 00 when 〈i2c (t)〉τ > 〈i200(t)〉 − 4, re-
spectively. The secure case 01/10 is interpreted as such
when 〈i211(t)〉 + 3 ≤ 〈i2c (t)〉τ ≤ 〈i200(t)〉 − 4. In earlier
work [31], the corresponding voltage-based threshold val-
ues 1 and 2 were chosen, for normalization purposes, to
be proportional to the related mean-square voltages, namely,
1 = β〈Du200(t)〉 with 0 < β < 1 and 2 = δ〈Du211(t)〉
with 0 < δ < 1, for the bit situations 00 and 11, respectively.
We choose 3 and 4 in a similar way below.
3 Error probabilities due to statistical inaccuracies
in noise current measurements
Bit errors occur when the protocol makes incorrect bit in-
terpretations due to statistical inaccuracies in the measured
Table 1 Types of errors in the KLJN bit exchange scheme for voltage-
based operation [31]
Actual situation
00 11 01/10
M
ea
su
re
m
en
tI
n
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n
(D
ec
isi
on
)
00 Correct Error
removed
(automatic)
Error
removed
(automatic)
11 Error
removed
(automatic)
Correct Error
removed
(automatic)
01/10 Errora Errora Correct
aThe paper addresses these errors and their probability
mean square noise current, and an error analysis for voltage-
based operation was presented before [31]. There are differ-
ent types of error situations, as shown in Table 1.
Similarly to the voltage-based case [31], two types of er-
rors need to be addressed for current-based measurements:
the 11 ==> 01/10 errors, i.e., errors when the actual situ-
ation 11 is interpreted as 01/10, and the 00 ==> 01/10 er-
rors when the actual situation 00 is interpreted as 01/10. The
probabilities for these types of errors are estimated below in
a similar way as before [31].
3.1 Probability of 11 ==> 01/10 type errors in
current-based measurement
We set R0 = R and R1 = αR, with α  1. The mean-square
channel noise current for infinite-time average at the 11 bit
situation is given by
〈
i211(t)
〉 = Si,11(f )BKLJN, (2)
where Si,11(f ) is the power density spectrum of the channel
current at the bit situation 11. From Eqs. (1a), (1b) we obtain
〈
i211(t)
〉 = 4kTeff 1
(1 + α)RBKLJN . (3)
Figure 3 shows a block diagram for the measurement pro-
cess at the 11 bit situation. The channel current first enters
a squaring unit. For typical practical applications, the out-
put signal is a voltage, because the squaring unit employs
voltage-signal-based electronics. However, for the sake of
simplicity and without loosing generality, we assume that
the numerical values of the voltage correspond to the mea-
sured current. Thus we keep the current-based notation as if
the electronics would be a current-based signal system. In
other words, the voltages are calibrated so that the numeri-
cal values are the same as those of the current. The numer-
ical value of this instantaneous amplitude is expressed as
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Fig. 3 Measurement process at
bit situation 11. 〈〉 denotes
infinite time (exact) average, Q
is transfer coefficient of a
hypothetical squaring device,
and iτ (t) is the noise component
of the finite-time average of the
square of the current
Qi211(t), where the constant Q = 1Amper denotes the trans-
fer coefficient of the hypothetical multiplier device provid-
ing a volt unit also for the square value [37]. This instan-
taneous amplitude then enters an averaging unit and, after
averaging for the finite duration τ , the measurement result
is mathematically expressed as 〈Qi211(t)〉τ = 〈Qi211(t)〉 +
iτ (t), where iτ (t) is the AC component remaining after the
finite-time average of Qi211(t). This averaging process can
be represented as low-pass filtering with a cut-off frequency
fB inversely proportional to τ , i.e., fB ≈ 1/τ .
The AC component iτ (t) of the finite-time average is
Gaussian, which follows from the Central Limit Theorem
because τ is much larger than the correlation time for the AC
component i2,11(t) = Qi211(t) − 〈Qi211(t)〉 of Qi211(t) since
fB 
 BKLJN . Thus the probability of the 11 ==> 01/10
type of errors is the probability that iτ (t) is beyond the
threshold, i.e., iτ (t) > 3. This probability can be evalu-
ated from the error function, but such a procedure requires
numerical integration. However, one can achieve an analytic
solution by using Rice’s formula [38, 39] of threshold cross-
ings, as discussed next.
Rice’s formula can be employed to compute the mean fre-
quency by which iτ (t) crosses the threshold value 3 [31].
If we define Si,τ (f ) as the power density spectrum of iτ (t),
the mean frequency of level crossing can be expressed as
ν(3) = 2
iˆτ
exp
(−23
2iˆ2τ
)√∫ ∞
0
f 2Si,τ (f )df , (4)
where iˆτ denotes the RMS value of iτ (t) and is given by
iˆτ =
√〈i2τ (t)〉 =
√∫ ∞
0 Si,τ (f )df . For normalization pur-
poses, we define the threshold value 3 as a fraction of the
Fig. 4 Spectra at bit situation 11.fB is the cut-off frequency for low–
pass filtering, Si,11(f ) and Si,τ (f ) are power density spectra of the
channel current at the bit situation 11 and of the noise component iτ (t),
respectively
measured mean-square channel noise current, i.e.,
3 = λ
〈
Qi211(t)
〉 = λQSi,11(f )BKLJN,
for 0 < λ < 1 (5)
The power spectral density Si,2,11(f ) for the AC component
i2,11(t) of i211(t) is considered next. According to previous
work [31, 37], and also as given in Fig. 4, Si,2,11(f ) can be
written
Si,2,11(f ) = 2Q2BKLJNS2i,11(f )
(
1 − f
2BKLJN
)
,
for 0 ≤ f ≤ 2BKLJN, (6)
and Si,2,11(f ) = 0 otherwise. The low-pass filtering effect
of the time averaging cuts off this spectrum for f > fB
but keeps the Si,2,11(f ) spectrum for f < fB . Considering
that fB 
 BKLJN , the value of Si,2,11(f ) can be approx-
imated by its maximum, i.e., Si,τ (f ) ≈ Si,2,11(0). Setting
γ = BKLJN/fB , one obtains
iˆτ =
√∫ ∞
0
Si,τ (f )df ≈
√
fBSi,2,11(0)
=
√
2Q2γf 2BS
2
i,11(f ) (7)
The frequency for unidirectional level crossings ν(3),
which is half of the value given by Rice’s formula, is
ν↑(3) = 1
iˆτ
exp
(−23
2iˆ2τ
)√∫ ∞
0
f 2Si,τ (f )df , (8)
where
3 = λQSi,11(f )γfB. (9)
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Using Eqs. (7) and (9) one obtains
ν↑(3) = fB√
3
exp
(−λ2γ
4
)
. (10)
Thus the probability εi,11 of the 11 ==> 01/10 type of er-
rors is
εi,11 ≈ ν↑(3)τ ≈ ν↑(3)
fB
= 1√
3
exp
(−λ2γ
4
)
. (11)
It should be noted that this error probability is an expo-
nential function of the parameters λ and γ , which is consis-
tent with earlier results [31]. The dependence on γ shows
that the error probability decays exponentially with increas-
ing bit exchange period τ .
3.2 Probability of 00 ==> 01/10 type errors
in current-based measurements
In order to compute this probability, we introduce ρ to define
the threshold 4 as a fraction of the measured mean-square
channel noise current. Thus
4 = ρ
〈
Qi200(t)
〉 = ρQSi,00(f )BKLJN ,
for 0 < ρ < 1, (12)
where Si,00(f ) is the channel noise spectrum at the 00 bit
situation.
Following the same procedure as above, the probability
εi,00 of the 00 ==> 01/10 type of errors is again found to
be exponentially scaling according to
εi,00 = ν(4)
fB
= 1√
3
exp
(−ρ2γ
4
)
, for 0 < ρ < 1. (13)
3.3 Illustration of results with practical parameters
Setting γ = 100 and λ = 0.5, the probability εi,11 for
11 ==> 01/10 type of errors is
εi,11 = 1√
3
exp
(−λ2γ
4
)
≈ 0.001. (14)
Increasing the parameter γ , and consequently τ , by a fac-
tor of two reduces the error probability to εi,11 ≈ 10−6.
The bit error probability εi,00 for the 00 ==> 01/10 type
of errors can be computed analogously to the bit error prob-
ability εi,11. In our case of α  1, the mean square noise
level at 11 is much closer to the value at 01/10 than to the
value at 00 (cf., Fig. 2 as an illustration). Therefore, the bit
error probability εi,00 will be significantly smaller than the
bit error probability εi,11. This situation is the opposite for
the case of the voltage-based method [31]. Accordingly the
experimental test of the KLJN scheme [30] used either the
voltage or the current data for decision, depending of which
scheme gave the smaller bit error probability.
4 An effective error removal method
Below we show a new error removal strategy, utilizing both
voltage and current measurements without applying any er-
ror correction algorithm, which is superior to the method
used in earlier work [30].
Let us assume that Alice and Bob measure both 〈u2c〉τ
and 〈i2c 〉τ . In an ideal error-free situation, the same bit in-
terpretations ensue from both mean-square channel noise
amplitudes. However, the bit interpretations can differ when
there are errors, because the current and voltage amplitudes
are statistically independent due to the Second Law of Ther-
modynamics (cf. Eq. (6)) and the Gaussian nature of the
noises (when the crosscorrelation between two Gaussian
processes with zero mean is zero, the two processes are sta-
tistically independent). To eliminate errors, we select the cu-
mulative measurement output that has the smallest error as-
sociated with it; see Fig. 5 and Table 2. We make use of
the fact that, in the bit situation when the current evaluation
method has maximum error probability, the voltage-based
method has minimum error probability, and vice versa. Fig-
ure 5 shows the three possible mean-square channel noise
current and voltage levels. The threshold values 1, 2,
3 and 4 again provide the boundaries for interpreting the
measured mean-square voltage and current values.
The only output that is kept is when both the current
and voltage bit interpretations are secure, i.e., when both
are 01/10. For instance, suppose that the bit interpretation
obtained from the current measurement is 00 and that the
bit interpretation for the voltage measurement is 01/10. In
this case, we assume 00 as the correct bit interpretation and
hence discard the bit.
Fig. 5 Mean-square channel noise measurements of current (a) and
voltage (b). (1, 2) and (3, 4) are the thresholds for interpret-
ing the measured mean-square voltage and current values, respec-
tively. (〈i211(t)〉τ , 〈i201/10(t)〉τ , 〈i200(t)〉τ ) and (〈u211(t)〉τ , 〈u201/10(t)〉τ ,
〈u200(t)〉τ ) are the mean-square channel noise currents and voltages at
the 11, 01/10 and 00 bit situations, respectively
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Table 2 KLJN error removal method with combined current and volt-
age analysis
Voltage measurement interpretation
00 11 01/10
Cu
rre
nt
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n
00 00
(Insecure/
Discard)
Discard
(check
attack)
00
(Insecure/
Discard)
11 Discard
(check
attack)
11
(Insecure/
Discard)
11
(Insecure/
Discard)
01/10 00
(Insecure/
Discard)
11
(Insecure/
Discard)
01/10
(Secure)
5 Error probabilities in the combined current–voltage
analysis method
The current and voltage noises are independent as a con-
sequence of the Second Law of Thermodynamics and the
Gaussianity of thermal noise, [27, 29], and hence the prob-
ability of errors in the combined current–voltage analy-
sis method is the product of the error probabilities of the
current-based and voltage-based methods.
5.1 Probability of 00 ==> 01/10 type errors in combined
current–voltage analysis
The probability ε00 of the 00 ==> 01/10 type of errors
in the voltage-based method is ε00 = 1√3 exp(
−β2γ
4 ) for
0 < β < 1, as reported before [31], and the probability εi,00
of the 00 ==> 01/10 type of errors in the current-based
method is εi,00 = 1√3 exp(
−ρ2γ
4 ) for 0 < ρ < 1, as shown
above. Thus the probability εt,00 of the 00 ==> 01/10 type
of errors in the combined method is given by
εt,00 = ε00εi,00 = 13 exp
(−γ (β2 + ρ2)
4
)
,
for 0 < β < 1 and 0 < ρ < 1. (15)
This error probability is again an exponential function of
the parameters.
5.2 Probability of 11 ==> 01/10 type errors in combined
current–voltage analysis
By following the same procedure as above, we find that the
probability εt,11 of the 11 ==> 01/10 type of errors in the
combined voltage and current measurements is also expo-
nential
εt,11 = ε11εi,11 = 13 exp
(−γ (δ2 + λ2)
4
)
,
for 0 < δ < 1 and 0 < λ < 1. (16)
5.3 Illustration of results with practical parameters
To demonstrate the results for the bit error probability, we
assign practical values to the parameters β , ρ and γ . For
γ = 100 and β = ρ = 0.5, we find that εt,00 is
εt,00 = ε00εi,00 = 13 exp
(−γ (β2 + ρ2)
4
)
= 1.24 × 10−6. (17)
If the duration of the bit exchange period, i.e., γ , is in-
creased by a factor of two (meaning that the speed is de-
creased by the same factor), the total bit error probability
εt,00 is decreased to εt,00 ≈ 4.6 × 10−12.
6 Conclusion and final remarks
We classified and evaluated the types of errors that occur in
the current-based scheme of the KLJN key exchange. These
error probabilities showed an exponential dependence on the
duration of the bit exchange, which is analogous to the result
for the corresponding voltage-based scheme as discussed in
earlier work [31].
Furthermore, we presented an error mitigation strategy
based on the combination of voltage-based and current-
based schemes: only those exchanged bits are kept that
are indicated to be secure by both the current and voltage
methods. The resulting error probability of this combined
strategy is the product of the error probabilities of the two
methods, which follows from the statistical independence of
the current and voltage measurements. As a consequence,
the KLJN scheme can operate without error correcting al-
gorithms, thereby preserving the independence of the ex-
changed bits of the secure key. Thus the key bits remain
independently and identically distributed random variables,
which is an important advantage for secure communica-
tion [27].
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